1 

1 

FACTS  AND  SUGGESTIONS                       j 

1 

1 

ON  THE  SUBJECTS  OF                                                               ; 

1 

1 

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1 

ttirenci  anb  Jircct  f  rabf, 

1 

AnitRKSSEO  ro  riiK 

CHAMBEII  OF  C031)IE1{CE 

OF 

MACOi^,   Oa. 

\ 

I;n    (iKN.  bl  FY    riRKKX. 


MAC  ox 


lUNTED  FOR  THE  CHAMBF-R  OF  (OMMLRCE 


SGI. 


THE 

WILLIAM  R.  PERKINS 

LIBRARY 

OF 


DUKE  UNIVERSITY 


Rare  Books 


FACTS  AND  SUGGESTIONS 


ON  THE  SUUJECTS  OF 


€\nxtu\i  n)i  Wntct  Crah, 


ADDRESSED  TO  THE 


CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE 


OF 


MA.CO]Sr,  Oa. 


By  Gen.  DUFF    GREEN 


MACON : 

PRINTED  FOR  THE  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE : 

1861. 


w 


LETTER 


TO  WM.  B.  JOHNSTON, 

President  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Macon,   Ga. 

Sir:  It  is  with  pleasure  I  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
invitation  to  attend  the  Convention,  proposed  to  be  held  in  Ma- 
con, on  the  14th  of  October,  for  the  purpose  of  considering  how- 
far  it  is  practicable  to  achieve  the  financial  independence  of  the 
Confederate  States  ;  and  having  given  to  the  subject  many  years 
of  anxious  consideration,  I  venture  to  submit  a  proposition  for 
the  organization  of  an  agency,  which  I  believe  will  be  an  effi- 
cient means  of  relieving  us  from  the  grievous  burdens  heretofore 
the  consequence  ot  our  system  of  Commerce  and  Finance. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States  of  March  26,  1860,  gives  a  statement  of  the  condition  of 
the  Banks  of  the  United  States,  from  which  1  have  prepared  the 
following  tables,  showing  their  capital,  loans  and  discounts, 
specie,  circulation  and  deposits.  That  we  may  the  better  real- 
ize their  relative  strength,  I  have  given  the  population  of  each 
State,  and  have  separated  the  slaveholding  from  the  non-slave- 
holdinir  States : 


Slaveholding 
STATES. 

g-s 

opq 

Capital. 

Loans  and 
Discounts. 

Specie. 

i 
i 

Circulation. 

(O 

o 

n 

Population. 

Alabama, 

Delaware 

8 
12 

2 
29 
45 
13 
31 
88 
:» 
20 
34 
65 

$4,901,000 

1,040,775 

:«)0,000 

10,(M«),50(J 

12,K«,G70 

24,490,866 

]2,.568,962 

9,0S2,951 

6,626,478 

14,962,062 

8,067,037 

16,205,156 

$13,570,027 
.3,150.215 
4t)4,6.30 
16,770,282 
25.2.H4,869 
35,401,009 
20,898,762 
15,461.192 
12.213.272 
27,801,912 
11,751,019 
24,975,792 

$2,747,174 

208,924 

32,876 

3,211,974 

4,502,250 

12,115,431 
2,779,418 
1,160,912 
1,617,687 
2,334,121 
2,267,710 
2,!»43,052 

$7,477,976 

1.135,772 

183,640 

8,798,100 

13,.520,207 

11,579,313 
4.100,869 
7,884,885 
5,594.047 

ll,475,0:i4 
5,.5;i8,378 
9,812,197 

$4,851,153 

976,226 

129,518 

4,738,289 

5.(;(;2,892 

li),777.812 

8,874,180 

.■;,.357,i7t; 

1.487,273 
4,10.5,615 
4,324,799 
7,720,IS2 

995,917 
112,362 
145,694 

(Vcorgia, 

Kentucky,    

Louisiana 

Marjland, 

Missouri, 

North  Carolina,. 
South  Carolina,. 

Tennessee, 

Virfjinia,        

Texas, 

1,082,797 
1,159,609 

000,431 

800,790 
1.201,209 
1,008,:J42 

715,371 
1,146,640 
1,593,199 

(i00,9.55 

Arkansas, 

440,775 

887,158 

120,000 

Mississippi, 

New  Mexico  and 
Indian  Tcrr'y. 

_    _  _ 

Total 

827 

$128,176,517 

$207,749,681 

$38,912,129 

$87,107,108 

$66,074,585 

12,683,  2 4t 

Non-8lavcliold- 
iuK  States. 


Connecticut, . . . 

Illinoie, 

Indiana, 

Iowa,   

Kansas, 

Maine 

Massachusetts, 

Michifran, 

X.  llkinpshire, . 
New  tlcrsey,  . .. 

New  York 

Oliio, 

Pennsylvania,  . 
Rhode  Island,.. 

\(Tmout 

Wisconsin, 

t;;ilifornia,. ... 
Minnesota,    ... 

Oregon, 

riah  Territory, 
Washington  do. 
Nebraska      do. 


00  m 

ng 


!^  5 


74 
74 
37 
12 
1 
68 

174 
4 
53 
49 

303 
52 
90 
91 
46 

108 


$21. 

5 


-I    Q 


7, 
64, 

5, 

7, 
HI, 

6, 
25, 
iO. 

4. 

7, 


502,176 
251,225 
343,210 
460,450 
52,000 
.506,890 
519,200 
755,465 
016,000 
,884,412 
441.320 
,890,838 
,.565,582 
,865,569 
,029,210 
,620,0J0 


$27,856,785 

:»7,229 

7,676,861 

724,2281 

48,25<; 

12,654,794 

107,417,323 

892,949 

8,591,6.38 

14,909,174 

200,351,332 

11,100,462 

50,327,157 

26,719,877 

6,946,52.] 

7,592,361 


Nonslavchold'g  1224  $  29:1,713,547  $  484,195,949 
Slaveholding, , .  I  3271128,176,517     207.749,681 


|9,'«9,920 
22:5,812 

l,5.s:5.140 

255,515 

8,28S 

670,979 

7,532,647 

24,175 

255,278 

940,700 

20,921.545 

1,82,'<.610 

8,378,474 
450,929 
198,409 
419.947 


$7,561,519 

8,981,723 

5,:390,ai6 

663,806 

8,395 

4,149,718 

22,087,920 

222,197 

3,271,18:1 

4,811,8-32 

29,959.506 
7,983,889 

13,1:12.892 
3,.558,295 
3.882,98:i 
4,439,8.55 


$4-4,662,4l)^(  ,$119,997,469   187,71 8..'>44 
;«,912.129'      87, 107,01s     66,074.585 


$5,574,900 

697,0:17 

1,700,479 

527,37,'^ 

2,695] 

2,411,022 

27,804.6'.t9 

:175.:197| 

l,187,9ftl 

5,741. 4*V) 

104.070.27;{ 

4,039.611 

26,167.843 

3,553,101 

778,8:14 

3,035,813 


460,670 

l.fiS7.404 

1,370.802 

682,002 

14:1,612 

619,95'^ 

1,231,494 

754,291 

326,072 

676,6)<1 

3,N51,563 

2.:i77,917 

2,924,601 

174,621 

316,827 

768,485 

384,770 

172,793 

52,566 

50,000 

11,624 

28,893 


19,0:»;118 
12,683,246 


I  find  in  a  newspaper  an  ai  ticl$,  credited  to  the  N.  Y.  News, 
so  appropriate  that  I  quote  it  at  large : 

"  There  is  so  much  misapprehcnaion  in  relation  to  our  foreign  trade,  and  it  is  so  impor- 
tant at  the  present  juncture  to  have  a  correct  understanding  upon  the  subject,  that  at  the 
risk  of  repetition  we  shall  recur  to  it  again.  For  this  purpose  we  shall  take  from  the  offi- 
cial returnsof  1861,  the  amount  of  exports,  distinguishing  the  exclusively  Northern  from 
the  exclusively  Southern  origin  of  the  articles : 

UNITED  STATES  EXPORTS.  southern  orisin. 

NORTHERN  oniaiN.  Forcst $    6,085,931 

Products  of  the  sea $4,156,180    Breadstuffs 9,567,597 

Forest 9,368,917    Cotton 191,806,555 

Provisions 20,215,226    Tobacco  19,278,621 

Breartstuflfs  19,022,901    Ucmp,  &c 746,370 

Manufactures 25,599,547    Manufactures 10,934,795 


Total  Northern  origin $77,363,070 


Total  Southern  origin $2'38,419,0S0 


Total  exports $335,782,740 

Imports  consumed 336,380,173 

These  arc  the  figures  of  the  Treasury  table,  and  their  careful  consideration  may  dispel 
some  strange  illusions  that  possess  the  public  mind.  Amoug  the  items,  it  will  be  observ- 
ed under  the  head  of  products  of  the  forest,  Georgia  piue  and  lum'ier,  naval  Btores,  &c., 
beara  high  figure.  All  those  who  have  been  patiently  awaiting  the  South  to  bo  "starved 
out"  will  observe  with  some  surprise,  that  it  supplies, one-third  of  all  the  breadstuffs  export- 
ed from  the  Union.  Ilence,  if  they  cannot  "  eat  Cotton,"  they  will  not  starve.  The  manu- 
factures which  originate  in  the  South  form  also  a  small  sum  total  for  which  many  are  not 
prepared. 

The  result  is  that  the  North  furnishes  one-fourth  of  the  merchandize  exported  and  the 
South  three  fourths.  It  will  now  be  understood  that  three-fourths  of  the  national  exports 
are  embargoed  by  blockade.  It  is  very  important  thoroughly  to  understand  that  fact,  be. 
cause  on  it  hangs  all  thejinance  qf  the  war.    Breadstuflfs  and  provisions,  it  will  be  observ- 


ed,  form  one  half  of  ihe  Northern  exports,  and  the  harvest  in  England  being  good,  those 
articles,  if  eold  at  all.  must  be  sold  very  low. 

If  \\f  t'lni  to  tlie  'mportations  into  the  cotmtry  we  find  the  following  results  : 
IMPORTS. 

Specie.  Goods.                            Total. 

North,                                                 $4,780,598  $.316,842,381                     $321,592,970 

SotJth,                                                   .3,770,540  30,802,738                         40,573,284 


Total,  '  $8,551,135  $:B3,fr45,119  $;i()2,166,2.'34- 

The  specie  imports  at  the  youth  are  mostly  silver  from  Mexico,  and  of  the  merchan- 
dize, coffee  counts  $0,731,017;  sugar  for  $3,500,000;  for  Western  account,  iron,  queens 
ware,  &c.,  for  the  balance.  Now,  if  we  bring  the  aggregates  together,  they  will  show  as 
follows : 

Total  Im.  Total  Ex.  Excess  Im.  Excess  Ex. 

North.  $310,812,381  $  77,367,070  $239,449,311  

South,  36,S02,';38  288,419,670      .  201,616,9.32 

We  have  here  the  conclusive  fact  that  the  three-fourths  of  the  whole  foreign  trade  of 
the  country  is  Southern.  Theexports  are  produced  there,  and  the  goods  they  get  payment 
for  conie'to  them  through  New  York,  to  the  great  profit  of  its  merchants.  The  South  also 
sent  North  for  Northern  consumption,  Iftst  yearas  follows  : 

Cotton,  1,000,000  bales.  $55,000,000 

Tobacco,  10,000,000 

Sugar,  18,000,000 

Rice,  ,  1,000,000 

Wheat  and  corn  '  5,000,000 

Naval  Stores,  1,000,000 


Total,  $90,000,000 

For  this  and  more,  domestic  manufacttires  and 'Western  produce,  mingled  with  impor- 
ted goods,  went  South  in  payment.  The  whole  of  this  is  blockaded.  The  Morrill  tariff 
was  intended  to  increase  the  proportion  of  domestic  manufacture  and  diminish  the  propor- 
tion of  imported  goods  sent  South  in  payment 

It  will  now  be  remembered  what  we  recently  stated,  that  even  if  the  North  can  sell  as 
•much  breadstuffslhis  year  as  in  the  year  of  short  harvests,  she  has  in  round  numbers  but 
$.30,000,000  with  which  to  pay  for  the  tea,  coffee,  sugar,  and  all  those  articles  that  made  up 
this  aggregate  of  $330  280,172  of  goods  Imported,  besides  $22,00'),(K)0  of  interest  money  to 
be  paid  abroad.  To  import  the  same  amount  will  involve  the  pajTiient  of  $'256,000,000  of 
specie  in  a  single  yi^ar,  or  every  dollar  in  the  country.  North  and  South.  If  one-third  only 
of  the  usual  imports  were  made,  the  pressure  for  specie  will  be  such  as  to  make  loans  im- 
possible and  taxes  unavailable.  An  importation  of  $125  000,000  only,  ^ould  give  hardly 
more  revenue,  even  under  the  Morrill  tarriff,  than  would  pay  the  interest  on  the  public 
debt,  while  it  would  convulse  the  country  by  draining  it  of  specie. 

The  fact  must  continually  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Middle  and  New  England  States 
can,  of  themselves,  have  jittle  or  no  trade  with  England  and  Western  Europe,  because 
they  are  producers  of  the  same  articles.  New  England  competes  with  Old  England  in  the 
purchase  of  raw  materials  and  food,  and  the  sales  of  manufactured  articles.  There  are  no 
trading  interests  between  them.  They  both  wart  Western  food,  and  both  want  Southern 
materials.  Of  the  importations  that  are  brought  into  New  York,  a  large  portion  goes  to 
the  South,  which  raised  the  produce  with  which  tney  were  purchased  through  New  York 
commercial  houses. 

In  this  connection,  we  call  attention  to  the  following,  from  the  London  Economist,  in 
relation  to  the  British  trade  for  the  first  three  months  of  this  year : 

"  Our  commerce  with  the  South  and  with  the  North  is  now  for  the  first  time  dividod 
in  the  official  tables.  It  appears  that  all  onr  direct  exports  are  to  the  North.  The  fig-- 
urerare: 


Exports  to  Northern  States, 
Exports  to  Southern  States, 


.t'3,922,1.^3 
174,50;J 


6 

Show  iuga  startling  contrast  in  the  amount  we  actually  eell  to  the  twc  hoUigerentS.    The 
coutraBt  is  nearly  as  remarkable  iu  what  we  buy,  only  it  is  reversed! 

Imports  into  Great  Britain  from  Northern  port?,  £4,097,868 

Imports  into  Great  Britain  from  Southern  porta,  6,13(i,i86 

'*  We  Bee  in  these  simple  figures  the  record  of  the  causes  of  much  that  has  occurred  in 
Lombard  street. 

"  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  say  with  which  of  the  combatants  in  this  miserable  struggle 
<\c  arc  the  most  connected.  One  party  supplies  ue  with  the  materials  of  our  industry,  the 
other  party  purchases  th£  fruits  of  that  industry  from  us." 

This  is  a  very  singular  error  for  so  high  a  commercial  antliority  as  the  Loudon  Econo- 
mist to  tall  into.  What  England  receives  is  Southern  produce,  direct  from  the  South ;  but 
what  she  sends  to  the  North,  that  is  to  say.  to  New  York,  is  on  its  way  to  the  South.  If  the 
separation  was  unfortunately  to  take  place,  England  would  not  continue  to  sell  large"  j-  to 
the  North,  but  the  goods  would  go  direct  to  the  ports  from  whence  the  raw  material  is  de- 
rived. In  such  an  unfortunate  state  of  affairs  the  West  would  be  bound  over  hand  and 
foot  to  the  Eastern  States.  She  would  have  to  buy  their  manufactures  dear  and  sell  them 
food  cheap.  The  interests  of  the  South  and  the  West  are  identical,  both  being  agricultural, 
and  both  of  them  sources  of  supply  for  Europe  iu  opposition  to  the  Eastern  States.  The 
great  Western  valley  of  th&Mississippi,  with  its  undeveloped  natural  manufacturing  ad- 
vantages, has  the  vast  Southern  market  open  to  its  future  enterprise,  when  capital  shall 
have  accumulated  from  agricultural  industry  and  fertile  land.  "This  war  is  retarding  her 
progress  fifty  years.at  least,  and  perhaps  ruining  it  forever. 

If  we  analyse  the  condition  of  the  l^anks,  we  find  that  they 
had — 

Loans  and  discounts  .  $G91,'»l.-.,580 

Circulation.  '  '    207,102,477 

Deposits,  S57,S0a,127 


Making  amass  of  credits  of,  $l,la2,S50,lS4 

Whilst  the  specie  in  alHhc-banks  was  only,  83,594,537 

■    It  will  be  seen  that  with  a  popi^lation  of  3,851,563,  Kew 
York  had— 

t-apital,  ■                 $111,441,320 

Depositcs,  104,070,273 

Loans  and  discounts,  200,•351^332 

Specie,  20,921,5ja 

Circulation,      •  29,959,500 

The  slaveholding  State?,,  with  a  iiopulation  of  12,683,246, 
had — 

Capital,  1126,176,517 

Deposites,  60,074,585 

Loans  and  discounts,  207,749,681 

Specie,  "^^  912,129 

fhcilation.  ■      ,                87,107,103 

Why  is  this?  We  have  seen  that  the  South  furnish  $238,- 
4:19,680  of  the  exports,  whilst  the  entire  ISTorth  furnish  but 
$77,368,070  ;  and  as  tbese  e.xpotts  are  the  basis  of  our  foreign 
trade,  there  must  be  some  efficient  cause  which  has  produced 
such  a  striking  difference  between  the  financial  organization  of 
the  North  and  of  the  South.     What  is  that  cause?     Is  it  not 


that  the  South  is  agricultural  and  the  North  is  commercial  and 
manufacturing?  Is  it  not  because  the  financial  system  of  the 
United  States  was  organized  in  reference  to  the  business  of  the 
North,  and  that  the  organization  is  not  suited  to  the  business  of 
the  South  ?  The  dealings  of  the  merchant  and  manufacturer 
are  from  day  to  day.  The  dealings  of  the  planter  are  from  year 
to  year.  The  banking  system  of  the  United  States  was  organ- 
ized in  reference  to  the  business  of  Northern  men,  and  is  there- 
fore adapted  to  the  business  of  merchants  and  manufacturers, 
whose  daily  receipts  enable  them  to  make  frequent  payments, 
but  it  is  not  adapted  to  the  business  of  planters,  whose  receipts 
being  from  year  to  yeai'^  require  an  entirely  different  financial 
arrangement.  Is  the  condition  of  the  financial  world  such  that 
we  can  organize  a  financial  system  suited  to  the  industry  and 
wants  of  the  South,  which  will  enable  th.e  planters  of  the  South  to 
make  a  safe  and  profitable  "use  of  credit? '  I  believe  it  is,  and 
propose  to  create,  as  the  basis  of  such  a  system,  an  agency,  to 
consist  of  an  incorporated  company  with  sufficient  capital,  to  be 
invested  in  good  public  and  private  securities,  with  branches 
an!  agencies  in  the  several  Confederate  States  and  in  Europe. 

3ave  we  the  means  of  creating  such  an  agency  ?  The  cot- 
toi;  crop  may  be  estimated  at  $200,000,000  per  annum.  Part 
of  1  he  proceeds  invested  in  the  Treasury  notes  or  bonds  of  the 
Coi:fe<lerate  States,  and  paid  in  as  the  capital  of  the  "  Agency," 
would  create  at  once  a  basis  of  credit,  which  would  enable  the 
Agency  to  borrow  money  in  Europe  on  their  hypothecation  at 
a  low  rate  of  interest  for  a  term  of  20  or  30  years,  and  to  ad- 
vance funds  to  Kailroad  companies  and  to  planters  and  others 
upon  such  terms  as  may  be  suited  to  their  means  of  payment. 

But  thougli  such  an  agency  would  in  this  way  do  much  to- 
wards the  financial  independence  of  the  South,  it  would  do 
much  more  by  furnishing  ample  means  for  a  direct  trade  to  Eu- 
rope and  elsewhere.  Our  merchants  have  heretofore  dealt 
chiefly  in  New  York  and  New  England,  and  it  will  be  difficult 
for  them  to  obtain  credit  in  Europe,  because  they  are  not  per- 
sonally known  there.  Such  an  agency  as  I  propose  could, 
through  its  branches  and  agencies  in  the  Confederate  States, 
ascertain  the  character  and  standing  of  merchants  wishing  to 


8 

purchase  goods  in  Europe,  and,  by  letters  to  their  branches  in 
London,  Paris  and  elsewhere  on  tlic  continent,  enable  any  mer- 
chant in  the  Confederate  States  to  purchase  goods  upon  as  fa- 
vorable terms  as  any  merchant  uf  New  York  could  do  under 
any  system  of  credit  whatever. 

Can  such  an  agency  be  organized?  I* believe  it  can,  and 
rely  upon  an  appropriation  of  part  of  the  proceeds  of  the  cot- 
ton crop  and  of  such  part  of  the  funds  invested  in  our  Railroads 
as  will  give  the  strength  and  resources  rec|uisite  to  the  end  pro- 
posed. Such  an  agency  should  be  so  organized  as  to  realize  the 
strongest  possible  credit,  and  this  can  be  done  if  we  can  suffi- 
ciently unite  the  planting  and  Railroad  interest  of  the  Confed- 
erate States.  Union  and  concert  of  action  between  them  would 
be  for  their  mutual  advantage,  and  would  command  the  co-op- 
eration of  a  large  mass  of  capital  already  invested  in  Railway 
shares  and  bonds  now  held  in  Europe,  and  bring  to  our  aid  a 
body  of  so  much  wealth,  intelligence  and  influence  as  to  secure 
certain  and  permanent  success.  But  as  the  proposition  embra- 
ces the  Railroad  as  well  as  the  planting  interest,  I  have  pre- 
pared the  following  Tables  from  data  given  in  the  Railroad 
Journal  and  the  published  returns  of  the  late  Census,  showing 
the  miles  of  Railroad  in  operation  in  each  State  and  their  cost 
with  efj[uipmcnts,  the  area  of  territory  and  the  population  of 
each  State — separating  the  slaveholding  from  the  non-slavehoh 
ding  States :  .. 


SLAVEHOLDmG  STATES. 

Miles  of 
Railroad 
in  oper- 
ation. 

Cost,  with 
etiuipment. 

Area,  in 
sq.  miles. 

Population. 

Alabama , 

798.0 
38.5 
47.9 
289.8 

1,211.7 
•I5s;.5 
41'J.O 
833.3 
305.4 
72;3.2 
770.2 
■       S07.3 

1.002.3 
284.5 

1,525.7 

$20,975,039 

i,ioO,no 

S,:il5,,S2o 

G,3(i8,(l'.»il 
25,087,220 
13,852,002 
10,073,270 
41,520,424 

9,024,444 
31,771,110 
13,098,409 
19,083.343 
27,:J48,141 

7,578,943 
43,009,800 

50,772 
52,198 
2,120 
59.208 
58,000 
37,080 
41,340 
11,070 
47.151 
05,037 
45,500 

;m.0oo 

.H,000 
274,350 

01,3.52 
400,000 

995,977 

Arkansas 

440,775 

Delaware 

112,;i.'')3 

Florida ■ 

145,0;il 

Georgia 

1,082,797 

Kentucky 

1.159,609 

Louisiana 

006,431 

Maryland  and  District  of  Columbia 

806,790 

Mississippi 

887,15M 

Missouri 

1,201,209 

North  Carolina 

1,008,3-12 

South  Carolina 

715,371 

Tennessee 

•   1,140,040 

Texas ; 

Virginia 

New  Mexico  and  Indian  Territory 

(i00,955 

1,593,199 

120,000 

Totals 

t»,6C5.0 

279,533,005 

1,283,850 

.  12,083,240 

9 


NON-SLAVEHOLDING  STATES. 


Miles  of  I 

Railroad    Cost,  with 
in  oper-  |  equipment , 
ation. 


Area,  in 
sq.  milcB, 


Population. 


California 

Connecticut 

niinoig 

Indiana , 

Iowa 

Maine 

Maesachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

New  Hampshire , 

New  Jersey 

NewYork 

Ohio 

Oregon ; 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode  Island 

Vermont 

Wisconsin 

Utah  Territory. 

Washington  Territory . 

Kansas  Territory 

Nebraska  Territory 


2-2.5 
fitio.e 
1,757.7 
,327.9 
.305.3 
544.6 
,428.3 
,132.8 

565.2 
556.4 
!,756.4 

1,008.2 

1,081.1 

63.6 

537.9 

626.0 


?2, 
25, 

107, 
31, 
13, 
20, 
65. 

•  44, 

1. 

17. 

20, 

137, 

327, 


477,110 
198,190 
720,937 
656,.371 
.347,475 
,4.31,701 
,319,921 
,072,226 
,000,000 
,785.111 
,463,455 
,077,621 
,949,123 


140 


509,261 
.747,508 
,765,7.52 
,570,044 


160,000 

4,750 

55,409 

.33,809 

50,914 

35,000 

7,800 

56,^3 

81,259 

9,280 

6,851 

46,000 

39,9(>4 

185,030 

47,000 

.     1,200 

8,000 

63,924 

187,923 

12:^,022 

114,798 

3:«,866 


384,770 

460,670 

1,687,404 

1,370,802 

682,002 

619,958 

1,231,494 

754,291 

172,79;j 

326,072 

076,084 

3,851,563 

2,377,917 

52,566 

3,924,501 

174,621 

315,827 

768,483 

50,000 

11,624 

143,642 

23,893 


Totals I    19,834.5  !  842,118.135 


1,644,(J44 


19,033,118 


There  are  some  striliing  and  instructive  facts  exhibited  in 
these  Tables  —  the  first  of  which  is,  the  large  sums  invested  in 
railroads,  and  the  character  of  the  investments.  Much  of  the 
sum  so  invested  in  the  Confederate  States  is  advanced  by  plant- 
ers, more  on  the  account  of  the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation of  their  Cotton,  than  of  the'  dividends  on  the  shares. 
With  them,  it  is  a  means  of  placing  their  crops  in  market,  ra- 
ther than  an  investment  of  capital.  The  appropriation  of  the 
sums  so  invested,  as  part  of  the  capital  of  an  "agency,"  to  be 
substituted  for  the  northern  and  foreign  agents,  whose  credit 
has  been  heretofore  so  important  a  part  of  the  machinery,  by 
which  Southern  produce  was  placed  in  the  foreign  market, 
would  seem  to  be  natural  and  easy;  and  especially  when  we 
take  into  account  tlie  fact  that  the  railroads  now  in  use  are  but 
the  commencement  of  a  system  requiring  an  expenditure  many 
times  greater  than  has  been  made,  and  that  the  proposed  agency 
would  enable  Southern  Hailroad  Companies  to  obtain  funds  for 
the  further  extension  of  the  system,  upon  terms  much  more 
favorable  than  could  otherwise  be  doqe. 

It  is  now  well  understood  and  admitted  that  money,  prop- 
erly and  economically  expended  on  well  located  railroads,  adds 
from  five  to  ten  times  the  sum  so  expended  to  the  value  of  the 
property  connected  with  such  improvements  ;  and  that  much 
of  the  boasted  wealth  of  the  Xorth  was  derived  from  the  use  of 
their  credit,  and  in  the  expenditure  of  the  large  sums  invested 


lO 

in  their  railroads.  The  sums  thus  expeiided  in  the  Nurth  were 
chiefly  borrowed,  and  the  credit  which  enabled  them  to  borrow 
was  created,  chiefly,  by  the  exports  which  were  derived,  as  we 
have  seen,  from  the  South.  But  there  is  another  strikins:  feat- 
ure of  the  j)ast,  which  is,  that  the  credit  of  the  Northern  Rail- 
road Companies  was  worth  more,  and  funds  could  be  obtained 
by  them  in  Europe  on  better  terms  than  they  could  be  obtained 
by  tiie  Railroad  Companies  of  the  South.  The  northern  roads 
cost  an  average  of  $42,364  per  mile,  while  the  cost  of  the 
southern  roads  was  l»ut  §2S,92Q.  The  value  of  the  exports  of 
the  South  was  more  than  three  times  that  of  the  North,  and 
being  chiefly  in  cotton,  rice,  tobacco,  lumber  and  naval  stores, 
all  bulky  and  heavy  articles  and  comparatively  cheap  commod 
ities,  furnishing  nearly,  if  not  quite,  eight  times  the  transporta. 
tion,  gave  greater  and  inore  certain  employment  to  the. south- 
ern roads,  and  consequently  a  surer  and  better  basis  of  credit. 
Why,  then,  was  the  credit  of  the  Northei-n  Railroad  Compans 
ies  better  than  the  "credit  i.-f  the  Southern  ?  Why  could  Massa- 
chusetts borrow  money  in  Europe  at  less  than  5  percent.,  when 
some  of  our  best  Southern  Railroad  (Companies  could  not  get  it 
at  10  per  cent.?  Is  not  the  answer  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  North  has  been  the  financial  agent  of  the  South  I  That 
whilst  the  excess  of  Southern  products  exported  was  §201  616,- 
932,  the  excess  of  Northern  imports  was  $230,4-10,311  ?■  Does 
not  this  solve  the  problem?  Does  it  not  explain  why  Northern 
credit  has  been  worth  more  than  Southern  credit  ?        .■   . 

Have  we  no  remedy  ?  How  did  the  North  obtain  the  con- 
trol of  so  large  a  part  of  our  exports?  Was  it  not  by  their  as- 
sociation of  capital  that  they  were  eriabled  to  control  the  ma- 
chinery of  commerce  ?  The  credit  of  an  association'  -of  fifty 
persons,  each  worth  ten  thousand  dollars,  is  much  stronger  than 
the  credit  of  either  or  all  of  them  separately;  It  is  in  the  asso. 
elation  of  capital,  and  concert  of  action,  that  the  financial  power 
of  the  North  consists.  If  we  would  relieve  ourselves  from  the 
tax,  which  they  have  levied  on  the  profits  of  our  labor,  we,  too, 
must  have  associations  of  capital  and  concert  of  financial  action  ; 
and  our  a'^sociation  and  our  action  should  be  adapted  to  the  na- 
ture and  wants  of  our  industry.  The  products  of  northern  labor 
are  made  available,  as  I  have  said,  from  day  to  day,  at  short 
periods ;  therefore  the  bank  discounts  at  sixty  or  ninety  days 
supply  their  wants  and  maintain  their  system  of  credits.     The 


11 

l)rodncts  of  southern  industry  are  made  available  from  year  to 
year,  and  tliercfore  the  jHanters  require  a  diffeient  financial 
system,  to  enable  them  to  make  a  ])rotitable  use  of  credit.-- 
Hence  the  northern  baidc**,  in  concert  with  the  Euroi)ean  con- 
sumers, have  organized  a  system  of  credits  f-r  the  movement  of 
the  cotton  crop,  which  Assumes  to  be  a  prompt  ]>ayment  to  the 
planter,  but  which  in  truth,  gives  to  the  purchaser  a  credit  of 
nearly  twelve  tnonths,  ^taxing  the  planter  with  several  com  mis- 
sions and  sundry  charges,  which  he  is  required  to  pay  as  an  in- 
dis])ensable>  ]iart  of  the  machinery,  by  which  more  than  $200,- 
000,000  are  paid  for  northern  imports  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
sales  of  southern  products,  to  l)e  charged  with  alarge  additional 
commercial  prolit  by  the  nurthern  merchant,  before  the  southern 
planter  is  permitted  to  use  the  merchandize  imported  and  paid 
for  with  the  pre  ducts  of  his  industry, 

I  am  awaie  that  the  planter  should  not  be  a  merchant,  and 
that  merchants,  ships  and  banks  are  indispensable  parts  of  the 
machinery  of  foreign  commerce.  I  do  not  propose  to  make  the 
planter  a  merchant,  or  to  dispense  with  a  single  southern  bank 
or  a  single  southern  merchant.  What  I  propose  is,  to  substitute 
8n  association  of  persons  interested  in  the  production  and  trans 
pol'tation  of  southern  staples  in  lieu  of  the  northern  and  foreign 
agents,  who,  by  the  use  of  the  Credit  predicated  on  their  control 
of  southern  labor,  have  levied  uiany  millions  of  dollars  in  the 
shape  of  commissions  and  commercial  profits,  upon  the  sale  of 
the  products  of  southern  industry.  The  process  heretofore  has 
been  that  the  merchants,  factors  and  banks  of  the  Sotith  deliv^ 
ered  the  products  of  southern  labor  to  northern  or  European 
agents,,  in  exchange  for  their  drodit  in  the  shape  of  bills,  which 
were  paid  out  of  the  proceeds  of  sales  made  in  the  North  and  in 
Europe.  I  propose  to  substitute  a  southern  agency,  composed 
chiefly  of  southern  planters,  who  by  depositing  with  the  agency 
in  payment  for  shares,  Confederate  bonds  an'd  notes,  or  other 
good  securities,  will  create  a  bona  fide  capital,  which  would 
have,  here  and  in  Europe,  greater  resources  and  a  better  credit 
than  the  northern  or  European  agents  to  be  superseded  "  by 
them,  and  who  being  directly  interested  in  protecting  the  value 
of  their  own  labor,  will  use  their  credit  and  capital  thus  creat- 
ed to  prevent  its  depreciation  in  the  foreign  markets.  It  will 
require  no  less  southern  banks  and  no  less  southern  merchants 
to  carry  on  the  trade  of  the  South  than  heretofore.     So  far  from 


12 

reducing  the  number  or  the  profits  of  the  southern  banks  or 
southern  merchants,  it  is  apparent  that  if,  as  I  believe,  the 
agency  will  aid  in  giving  a  direct  trade  witli  Europe,  and  by 
dispensing  with  northern  agents  and  northern  merchants,  in- 
crease the  value  of  southern  exports,  it  will  increase  in  like  pro- 
portion the  amount  of  southern  imports,  increasing  in  that  pro- 
portion the  consumption  of  ioreign  goods,  which  being  free  from 
the  northern  taxes  heretofore  levied  in  the  shape  of  custom 
duties  and  commercial  profits,  will  not  only  increase  the  num- 
ber^  but  will  proportionally  iucrease  the  profits  of  southern  mer- 
chants. The  banks  are  the  appropriate  agenta  of  the  merchants, 
and  a  system  which  increases  the  nu:::iber  and  profits  of  tiie  mer- 
chants, will  benefit  the  banks. 

But  I  return  to  the  objection  that  the  planter  should  be  a 
planter.  He- now  employs  a  factor,  through  whom  he  transfers 
his  crop  to  the  northern  or  European  agent,  by  whom  it  is  sold 
•in  the  North  or  in  Europe.  What  I  propose  is,  that  the  plant- 
ers shall,  by  association,  create  an  agency  to  supercede  the 
northern  or  foreign  agents.  I  admit  that  the  value  and  efticien- 
cy  of  that  agency  will  depend  upon  the  persons  chosen  to  ra9n- 
age  it,  and  that  these  persons  will  be  chosen  by  the  planters. 
But  if  the  planter  is  competent  to-select  factors  qualified  to 
select  the  northern  and  foreign  agents,  heretofore  part  of  the 
machinery  of  southern  trade,  surely  they  will  be  competent  to 
select  proper  persons  for  the  management  of  the  agency  to  be 
organized  by  them  as  a  substitute  for  the  northern  and  foreign 
agents  heretofore  selected  by  their  factors.  The  question  then 
is  reduced  to  thi^  :  Are  the  planters  of  the  South  competent  to 
select  proper  persons  to  manage  such  an  agency,  and  can  such 
persons  be  selected  in  the  South  ?  That  the  planters  can  aftbrd 
to  .pay  salaries  sufficient  to  command  the  best  talents,  of  tried 
and  unimpeached  integrity,  cannot,  be  questioned  ;  and  that 
such  persons  can  be  had  for  sufficient  compensation,  is  appar^ 
ent  in  the  skill  and  entei-prise  which  characterize  the  people  of 
the  South,  whether  tested  by  the  management  of  our  banks, 
our  railways,  our  literarj^  institutions,  or  in  the  cabinet,  the 
forum,  the  plantation  or  the  field  of  battle.  That  we  have 
among  us  persons  competent  to  execute  the  trust,  and  that  the 
association  will  be  fully  competent  to  select  them,  we  require 
no  further  proof  than  a  comparison  of  the  management  of  our 
banks  and  our  railroads  with  themanaijement  of  the  banks  and 


13 

railroads  in  the  North.  What  northern  railroad  can  compare 
favorably  with  the  railroads  of  Georgia,  or  what  President  or 
Superintendent  of  a  northern  railroad  can  compare  favorably 
with  the  Presidents  and  Superintendents  of  our  railroad  com- 
panies ? 

But  these  considerations  address  themselves  to  the  pecunia- 
ry interests  of  the  South.  1  would  present  higher  and  stronger 
motives  for  the  proposed  association,  which  belong  to  the  polit- 
ical relations  of  the  Confederate  States  with  the  other  peoples 
of  the  earth. 

The  entire  population  of  the  world  is. estimated  as  follows  : 

Africa,  (an  estimate)  from  60,000,000  to 200,000,000 

America  ' 67,896,041 

Asia,  including  islands 775,000,000 

Australia,  and  islands 1,445.000 

Europe, 275,806,741 

Polynesia,  (an  estimate) 1,500,000 

Making  eitimated  population  to  be 1,301,647,782 

As  the  population  of  Asia  is  so  much  greater  than  that  of 
Europe,  and  the  trade  of  India  has,  in  the  progress  of  European 
civilization,  been  more  or  less  a  monopoly,  it  has,  in  tarn,  en- 
riched the  nations  by  whom  it  was  enjoyed,  from  the  days  of 
Solomon  until  now.  A  close  monopoly  of  this  trade  was  held 
by  the  British  East  India  Company  for  more  than  two  hundred 
years.  '  They  levied  a  tribute  so  great  and  imposed  burdens  so 
onerous,  that,  having  exhausted  the  accumulated  wealth  of  the 
former  governments  of  India,  they  were  compelled  to  rely,  for 
payment  of  their  demands,  chiefly  upon  the  cheap  manufac- 
tures of  India.  But  the  invention  of  the  cotton-gin,  the  power 
loom  and  the  spinning  jenny,  had  reduced  the  cost  of  tex- 
tile fabrics  in  England  so  much  below  the  cost  of  production  in 
India  that  the  East  India  Company  could  no  longer  make  a 
profit  on  such  goods  imported  from  India.  It'  was  also  found 
that  the  other  European  nations,  profiting  by  the  example  of 
England,  had  established  for  themselves  a  system  of  manufac- 
tures, and  instead  of  being,  as  they  had  been,  consumers  of 
British  goods,  had  become  competitors  in  the  markets  of  the 
world.  These  European  nations  had  few  or  no  tropical  colonies, 
and  it  was  seen  that,  exercising  a  control  over  the  trade  with. 
India,  England,  by  exchanging  her  manufactures  for  the  trop- 
ical products  of  India  suited  to  the  wants  and  consumption  of 
her  European  competitors,  could  still  levy  a  tribute,  in  the 


14: 

6ha}>c  of  commercial  proHtB,  on  the  tropical  products  of  India, 
which  she  might  receive  in  exchange  for  her  manufactures,  and 
sell  for  consumption  to  tlie  other  nations  of  Europe.  But  it  vas 
foreseen  by  Warren  Hastinffs,  the  conqueror  of  India,  and  he 
wrote  a  pamphlet  to  prove,  that  African  labor  in  America  could 
produce  at  less  cost  than  the  labor  <tf  India  could  |»ruduce  in 
India,  and  that  therefore  the  abrogation  of  the  African  slave 
trade  was  indispensable  to  a  profitable  trade  with  India.  It  was 
seen  that  the  abrogation  of.  the  African  slave  trade  necessarily 
involved  the  abrogation  of  the  monopoly  of  the  East  India 
Comj>any  and  the  repeal  of  the  discriminating  duties  favoring 
the  West  India  planters  ;  and  the  merchants  of  Liverpool  inter- 
ested in  the  slave  trade,  the  owners  of  Weat  India  estates  and 
the  East  India  Company  united  their  influence  and  prevented 
the  contemplated  measures  until  1833,  when  the  British  Parli- 
ament emancipated  the  slaves  in  the  West  Indies,  repealed  the 
discriminating  duties  favoring  West  India  produce,  abrogated 
the  East  India  monopoly  and  opened  the  trade  of  India  to  Brit- 
ish .enterprise.  The  late  wars  with  Russia,  India  and  China, 
were  but  parts  of  the  same  system  of  measures  for  the  main- 
tenance and  promotion  of  British  commeiCe,  and  illustrate  the 
extent  and  the  manner  in  which  the  power  and  resources  of 
England  will  be  exerted  for  that  object.  Let  us  pause  and  ex- 
amine the  bearing  of  these  facts  upon  the  future  of  the  Confed- 
erate States,  and  especially  upon  their  relation  to'  the  interests 
and  prosperity  of  the  planters  of  these  States. 

The.  productive  industry  of  a  people  is  the  true  source  of 
their  wealth.  England  and  Wales,  with  a  population  of  less 
than  20,000,000,  are  estimated  to  have,  in  their  machinery,  a 
creative  power  eqital  to  the  labor  of  (100,000,000  of  men.  It  is 
the  profits  derived  trom  this  employment  of  her  capital  that  en 
ables  lier  to  pay  $4:11,000,000  of  taxes,  the  sum  required  to 
pay  the  interest  on  her  national  del>t  and  the  current  expenses 
of  her  governiiient.  With  her,  then,  the  maintenance. and  con- 
tinuance of  her  system,  of  industry  and  commerce, -is  an  indis- 
pensable necessity.  She  has  5,000,000  of  people  eiiiployed, 
and  more  than  $500,000,000  of  capital  invested  in  the  purchase 
and  manufacture  of  cotton,  and  is. dependent  upon  the  Confed- 
erate States  for  three  fourths  of  the  supply  of  the  raw  mateiial. 
The  question  which  most  interests  the  more  civilized  and  weal- 
thy nations  of  the  earth,  who  use  machinery,  is,  how  they  can 


15 

most  advantageously  dispose  of  the  products  of  tteir  industry 
to  the  less  civilized,  who  do  not  use  machinery ;  and  hence, 
France  and  England,  burying  the  traditional  hatred  of  ages, 
united  in  opposing  the  progress  of  Russia  and  in  the  war  with 
China,  and  made  it  a  condition  of  the  peace  with  China  that 
they  should  be  ])erniitted  to  introduce  their  manufactures  into 
China,  and  to  take  Chinese  coolies,  as  laborers,  to  Australia 
and  Algeria — the  purpose  being  to  use  them  as  slaves^  in  the 
culture  of  cotton.  I  refer  to  these  facts  to  show  the  relation 
which  the  growth  and  manufacture  of  cotton  have  to  the  pro- 
gress and  civilization  of  the  age  in  which  we  live,  and  to  enforce 
the  necessity  jvnd  propriety  of  an  association  of  those  interested 
in  its  production,  for  the  maintenance  and  advancement  of  their 
common  interests.  We  have  a  climate,  soil  and  labor,  which 
enable  us  to  defy  all  competition  ;  and  we  may  assume  that 
the  progress  of  events  and  of  public  opinion  will  vindicate  the 
character  of  our  industry,  and  place  the  Confederate  States 
among  the  first  and  greatest  of  civilized  nations  ;  and  yet  there 
are  several  features  in  the  crisis  in  which  we  are  "now  placed, 
which  deserve  to  be  considered. 

The  population  of  the  United  States  in  17!»0  was  3,929,872, 
of  whom  697,897  were  slaves.  In  1^60'  it  was  31,676,217,  of 
whom  more  than  12,000,000  were  in  the  slaveholding  States 
and  more  than  4,000,000  were  slaves.  The  same  relative  in- 
crease would,  in  the  next  seventy  years,  give  within  the  limits 
of  the  late  United  States,  a  population  of  255,000,000,  and  to 
the  slaveholding  States,  including  New  Mexico  and  the  Indian 
Territory  west  of  Arkansas,  nearly  100,000,000,  of  whom  24,- 
000,000  will  be  slaves,  enabling  the  Soutl^, to  furnish  more  than 
24;000,000  bales  of  cotton.  -  ;  '  ■ 

Europe,  excluding  Russia  and  Turkey,  hus  a  pop'iUa'J-m  (  f 
195,434,660,  on  a  territory  of  1,455,025  square  >  '^  -.  divided 
into  fifty  separate  governments,  as  follows  : 

Slateiof  Europ(. 
Andorra  (Pyrenees) 
Anhalt-Bcmburg,    - 
Anhalt-Dcssau-Cotten  - 
Austria,         .  .  .  . 

Baden,     ..... 
Bavaria,        .... 
lielginm,  .... 

Bremen.         .  .  .  . 

Brnnpwick,         .... 
Church,  States  ol  the 


Governnienls. 

Sq.  miles. 

PcqvdatUm. 

Republic, 

.190 

7,000 

Duchy 

a39 

56,031 

" 

678 

119,515 

Empire, 

248,551 

35,040,810 

-   Grand  Duchy, 

5,712 

1,335,952 

-    Kingdom, 

28,435 

4,615,748 

" 

11,313 

4,671,183 

-    Free  City, 

112 

88,850 

-     Dticliy 

1,525 

274,069 

-   Popedom, 

12,082 

2,110,080 

16 


states  of  Evrope. 
Denmark. 
France, 
Frankfort, 
Great  Britain. 

Greece,    -         -         -         - 
Ham'bnrg, 
Hanover, 
Ueese-Caesel. 
ncsse-Darmstadt, 
nesse-Homburg,     - 
Holland  with  Luxembourg,   - 
Ionian  Islands 
Lichtenstein, 
Lippe, 

Lippe  Schaumburg, 
Lubec,  -  -    ■     - 

Mecklenburg-Schwei  in, 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 
Monaco, 
Nassau, 
Oldenburg, 
Portugal, 
Prussia,         '    - 
Reuss,  Principalities  of   - 
San  Marino, 
Sardinia, 
Saxony,    -  - 

Saxe-Altenburg, 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotba,    - 
Saxe-Me  in.-Hilburgh. , 
Saxe-Weim.-Eisenach, 
Schwartzburg-Rudolstadt, 
Schwartzburg-Sondershausen. 
Sicilies,  The  Two    - 
Spain,      -  .  -  - 

Sweden,  {     - 

Norway,  )  -  -  - 

Switzerland, 
Waldeck, 
Wirtemburg, 


Government. 

Sq.  miles. 

Poj'^iodon . 

Kingdom, 

21,856 

2,468,713 

Empire, 

212,341 

36,746,432 

Free  City, 

39 

79,278 

-    Kingdom, 

110,840 

28,888,597 

" 

18,344 

1,067,216 

-    Free  City, 

135 

222,379 

Kingdom, 

14,600 

l.SU3,976 

-  Electorate, 

4,430 

726,686 

Grand  Duchy, 

3,761 

845,571 

Landgravate, 

106 

25,746 

Kiijgdom, 

13,890 

3,494,161 

Republic, 

1,006 

246,483 

Principality, 

61 

T,150 

" 

446 

106,086 

-      " 

170 

30,144 

-     Free  City, 

1«3 

55,423 

Grand  Duchy, 

4,701 

541,395 

"        " 

997 

99,628 

Principality, 

12 

7,627 

Duchy, 

1,736 

443,648 

Grand  Duchy, 

2,470 

2M,359 

-     Kingdom, 

34,500 

3,5(J8,895 

" 

107,300 

17,739,918 

Principality, 

5S8 

121.203 

Republic, 

21 

8,000 

-     Kingdom, 

48,026 

11,029,21(5 

- 

5,705 

2,122,148 

Duchy, 

491 

135,574 

" 

790 

153,879 

" 

968 

168,816 

" 

1,403 

267,112 

Principality, 

405 

70,030 

" 

358 

62,074 

-    Kingdom, 

41,521 

8,703,130 

" 

176,480 

15,454,514 

" 

170,715 

3,639,3.32 

" 

121,725 

1,490,047 

-     Republic, 

15,301 

2,391,478 

Principality, 

455 

57,550 

-     Kingdom, 

7,568 

1,690,898 

Totals 


1,455,205  195,434,660 


'Now  when  we  take  iuto  consideration  the  fact  that  England 
waged  a  war  of  more  than  20  years  against  France  to  prevent 
the  conquest  of  any  of  these  governments,  for  the  avowed  pur- 
pose of  maintaining  the  balance  of  po^er  as  it  existed  in  En- 
rope,  and  that  she  has  since  united  with  France  to  arrest  the 
progress  of  Russia  and  to  compel  China  to  purchase  her  manu- 
tactures  and  furnish  Coolies  as  slaves,  it  is  not  to  be  presumed 
that  she  will  permit  the  United  States  to  annex  her  American 
colonies,  or  that  she  will  unite  in  the  subjugation  of  the  South. 
For  as  if  the  Union  'had  been  preserved  and  the  same  ratio  of 


17 

increase  were  maintained,  it  would  give  to  the  United  States  at 
the  end  of  the  next  seventy  years  more  than  255,000,000  of  peo- 
ple, it  surely  requires  no  argument  to  satisfy  intelligent  minds 
that  England  will  greatly  prefer  to  foster  and  strengthen  the 
Confederate  States,  not  only  because  she  prefers  the  creation  of 
an  independent  government  as  a  check  upon  the  otherwise  pre- 
ponderating power  of  the  United  States,  but  because  the  failure 
of  all  their  eftbrts  to  obtain  a  supply  of  cotton  elsewhere  must 
convince  the  manufacturers  of  England  that  our  soil,  climate 
and  labor  are  best  suited  to  its  production,  and  if  they  do  not 
purchase  the  raw  material  from  us,  we  will  become  their  most 
successful  competitors  in  its  manufacture.  For  the  slavehc)ld' 
ing  States,  including  those  to  be  formed  west  of  Arkansas,  will 
have  a  territory  of  more  than  1,200,000  square  miles,  cajmble  of 
sustaining  a  population  greater  than  all  the  population  of  Europe, 
and  as  England  and  the  other  manufacturing  States  of  Eurojje 
will  be  dependent  on  us  for  the  supply  of  the  raw  material,  so 
essential  to  their  industry,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  late  success 
of  our  arms  will  induce  the  leading  powers  of  Europe  to  unite 
in  urging  the  acknowledgment  of  our  independence,  and  that 
their  interference  will  give  us  peace.  If  the  war  and  the  block- 
ade continue,  then,  if  the  Confederate  Gov^-nmeut  purchases 
the  cotton  crop  and  pays  for  it  in  Treasury  notes  ^vithout  inter- 
est, that  purchase  and  the  expenditures  of  the  war  will  give  us 
an  abundant  and  cheap  currency  to  be  employed  in  building 
up  mauufactures;  and  availing  ourselves  of  improved  machinery, 
we  can  convert  our  cotton  into  yarns  and  cloths,  and  should  the 
war  continue  for  threfe  years,  we  can  then  supply  the  increasing 
demand  in  Africa,  India  and  China  with  greater  profit  than  it 
can  be  supplied  by  Great  Britain  herself. 
The  estimate  is  that  she  has  invested 

In  spinning  and  weaving, $3:26,250,000 

In  dyeing  and  bleaching, 150,000,000 

In  transportation  and  purchase  of  cotton, 47,500,000 

Making  the  entire  sum  which  she  has  invested  in  the  manufacture  but,       -       $503,750,000 

The  war  of  1812  caused  large  sums  to  be  invested  in  manu- 
factures in  the  Northern  States,  and  if  the  war  continues  and 
we  are  prevented  from  exchanging  our  cotton  for  British  man-> 
ufactures,  it  will  divert  large  sums  into   manufactures  in  the 


18 

South.  "\V"e  will  in  that  case  be  enabled  to  produce  cheaper 
and  undersell  all  competitors.  We  can  raise  our  own  food  and 
thus  we  will  have  cheap  bread.  We  can  raise  our  own  cotton 
and  thus  save  the  cost  of  transportation.  We  will  be  more  than 
half  way  on  the  route  from  Europe  to  China,  which  is  to  be- 
come the  chief  market,  and  if  England  and  France  do  not  unite 
with  us  in  coercing  a  peace,  the  shipping  interest  of  the  East 
and  the  manufacturing  and  agricultural  interests  of  the  North- 
west will  soon  unite  and  give  us  a  peace.  If  they  do  this  and 
the  Northwest  be  wise  and  becomes  a  separate  government,  as 
is  more  than  probable,  then  if  that  section  establishes  proper 
commercial  relations  with  as,  it  will  become  the  seat  of  the 
richest  manufacturing  industry  in  the  world,  and  receiving 
their  supplies  of  the  raw  material  and  tropical  products  from 
the  South,  these  two  people  will  be  bound  together  by  interests 
stronger  even  than  the  late  constitutional  Union.  In  either 
case  we  should  have  our  "  Agency"  to  foster,  promote  and  sus- 
tain our  financial  independence. 

Do  you  not  see  in  the  manifestation  of  God's  providence  in 
the  progress  of  the  slaveholding  States,  that  He  has  committed 
to  them,  as  a  chosen  people,  an  important  and  peculiar  trust, 
connected  with  the  spread  of  His  gospel  ?  Did  He  not  send 
the  Huguenots  to  South  Carolina,  the  Chivalry  to  Virginia  and 
North  Carolina,  the  Puritans  to  New  England,  the  Quakers  and 
Scotch  Irish  to  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Catholics  to  Maryland 
under  circumstances  which  necessarily  gave  birth  to  the  revolu- 
tion, which  created  the  United  States?  Did  He  not  by  the 
slave  trade  bring  into  the  United  States  some  400,000  African 
slavee,  who  by  their  natural  increase  now  number  more  than 
4,000,000?  Has  He  not  permitted  a  false  philanthropy  and  a 
false  religion  to  bring  the  descendants  of  these  Africans  within 
the  Southern  States,  where  the  climate,  soil  and  productions 
five  the  best  reward  for  their  industry  ?  Has  He  not  fostered 
and  developed  the  resource's  ot  these  States,  so  increased  their 
numbers,  and  so  trained  and  educated  our  people  that  they 
have  the  strength,  the  will,  the  resources  and  the  knowledge, 
aided  as  they  manifestly  are  by  His  superintending  providence, 
to  assert  and  maintain  their  independence  as  a  nation  ?  Do  you 
not  see  that  the  tendency,  if  not  the  inevitable  consequence,  of 


19 


the  pending  war  will  be  to  give  a  unity  of  inteiest  and  of  opinion 
and  a  consequent  permanence  to  the  government  of  the  Confeder- 
ate States,  which,  as  their  territory  is  sufficient  to  sustain  a  popu- 
lation of  more  than  200,000,000,  must  in  a  few  years  give  them 
a  numerical  strength  greater  than  any  other  of  the  civilized  na- 
tions of  the  earth  ?  For  it  is  obvious  that  instead  of  having  such 
a  bond  of  union  as  our  institution  of  African  slavery  gives  to 
us,  the  rivalries  and  conflict  of  interests  between  the  Eastern 
and  "Western  States  of  the  Federal  Union  will  cause  them  to 
divide,  like  the  governments  of  Europe,  into  many  nationali- 
ties? Do  you  not  see  that  tlie  active  and  angrj^  discussions  of 
the  questions  of  slavery  and  the  tariff,  which  have  so  much  ab- 
sorbed the  public  mind  for  the  last  thirty  j-ears,  were  providen- 
tially interposed  to  unite  us  and  prepare  us,  as  a  people,  for  be- 
coming a  separate  and  independent  nation  ?  Have  you  not  seen 
that  our  President  and  Congress  acknowledge  that  the  strong 
hand  of  the  Almighty  has  upheld  our  armies  and  given  them 
the  victories  won  on  the  field  of  battle  ?  Do  you  not  realize 
that  the  great  heart  of  our  people,  of  men,  women  and  children, 
unite  in  c.ie  common  sentiment  of  faith,  gratitude  and  praise 
to  God  iv:  these  manifestations  of  His  preference  and  protec- 
tion? 

Why  it  it  that  we,  as  a  people,  are  thus  made  the  special 
objects  of  Grod's  providence?  What  is  the  trust  committed  to 
us  and  what  its  purpose?  "What  is  our  peculiar  characteristic 
as  a  nation?  Is  it  not  that  we  are  the  owners  of  African  slaves 
and  produce  by  their  labor  the  greater  part  of  the  cotton,  which 
forms  tlie  basis  of  that  comnierce  which  is  so  efficient  an  agency 
for  the  spread  of  the  gospel  ?  If  1  am  correct  in  these  views, 
(and  who  can  doubt  it?)  then  the  Confederate  States  are  to  be 
the  first  and  greatest  of  civilized  nations,  a  people  chosen  in  the 
providence  of  God,  to  whom  He  has  committed  in  an  especial 
manner  an  important  part  of  that  commerce  which  is,  as  it  were, 
the  wings  upon  which  He  sends  His  gospel  to  heathen  nations? 
If  this  be  so,  and  credit  be  as  we  have  seen,  so  important  and 
indispensable  for  the  development  of  our  industry  and  the  ex- 
tension of  commerce,  then  such  an  organization  and  consolida- 
tion of  capital  as  the  proposed  agency  will  create,  is  not  only  a 
financial  necessity,  but  an  indispensable  christian  duty.  For  if 
the  war  continues,  it  will  give  a  safe  and  profitable  investment 


20 

of  the  notes  and  bonds  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  if  we  have 
peace,  it  will  aid  the  direct  trade  to  Europe,  and  so  lar  as  it  may 
prevent  an  undne  export  of  specie  will  sustain  the  credit  of  our 
banks  and  give  stability  to  our  currency,  which  will  ]iromote 
the  employment  and  greater  distribution  of  labor,  which  will 
secure  our  permanent  prosperit}'. 

The  remarks  on  the  proposed  issue  of  Treasury  notes  sub- 
mitted to  the  late  Convention  of  cotton  planters,  and  by  them 
ordered  to  be  printed,  were  intended  to  show  that  an  issue  of 
Treasury  notes  is  the  best  form  in  which  the  loan  to  the  Confed- 
erate States  can  be  made.  The  statistics  given  demonstrate 
that,  inasmuch  as  the  Treasury  notes  are  to  be  convertable  into 
S  per  cent,  bonds,  the  amount,  which  may  not  be  so  converted, 
will  be  of  equal  value  with  the  bonds,  and  that  as  the  bonds 
will  be  equal  in  value  to  gold  and  the  notes  may  be  converted 
at  the  pletisure  of  the  holder,  all  beyond  the  sum  required  as  cur- 
rency will  be  so  converted,  and  therefore  the  sura  so  required 
will  not  depreciate  much,  if  any,  below  the  value  of  gold  and 
silver. 

Those  remarks  were  hastily  thrown  together,  at  the  request 
of  gentlemen  of  wealth,  experienced  in  the  cotton  trade  in  New 
Orleans,  and  submitted  to  the  Convention,  imperfect  as  I  knew 
them  to  be,  because  I  believed  their  chief  value  to  consist  in  the 
facts  and  statistics  they  gave,  rather  than  in  any  suggestions  or 
arguments  of  mine.  1  am  sensible  that  finance  and  currency, 
inv61viDg  as  they  do  the  progress  and  prosperity  of  civilized  so- 
ciety, have  been  elaborately  discussed  by  men  of  such  ability 
and  position  that  their  opinions  have  assumed  the  weight  of 
authority.  Yet  I  do  not  hesitate  to  assert  that  there  is  scarce 
any  subjects,  affecting  their  interests,  less  understood  by  the 
great  mass  of  the  people.  If  the  laborer  or  man  of  business  can 
use  a  bank  note  as  gold,  he  does  not  stop  to  ask  what  is  its  real 
value,  but  receives  it  as  money  because  others  will  so  receive  it 
of  him.  This  confidence  in  the  value  of  bank  notes  is  the  re- 
sult of  habit,  and  rests  chiefly  on  a  fallacy,  to-wit :  a  belief  that 
the  bank  note  is  the  .actual  bona  fide  representative  of  specie, 
and  may  at  all  times  be  converted  into  gold  or  silver  coin.  To 
prove  that  this  belief  is  a  fallacy,  I  refer  to  the  Report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  dated  2G  March,  1S60,  which  shows 
that  the  circulation  of  the  banks  of  the  United  States,  as  exhib- 


21 


ited  by  the  returns  to  the  Treasury  Department,  nearest  to  the 

1  Jan.,  ISCO,  was,       -•-..-  $-207,lO2,47~ 

Whilst  their  specie  was  but, !?3,5St  59T 

It  is  obvious  that  the  S3  millions  of  specie  could  not  redeem 
the  207  millions  of -bank  notes,  and  yet  these  bank  notes  were 
equal  in  value  to  gold  and  silver.  Why  so?  The  same  report 
shows  that  the  loans  and  discounts  were  $691,045,580.  It  is 
apparent  therefore  that  what  gave  value  to  the  $207,102,477  of 
bank  notes,  was  not  the  $S3,534,o97  of  specie,  but  the  $691,045,- 
580  of  loans  and  discounts.  It  was  not  the  specie  held  in  their 
vaults,  but  the  bills  receivable  held  in  their  drr^wers  that  gave 
value  to  the  bank  circulation.  Does  not  this  show  that  the  val- 
ue of  the  bank  note  depends  much  more  on  the  ability  of  those 
who  are  indebted  to  the  banks  to  pay  in  bank  notes  what  they 
owe,  than  it  does  on  the  specie  in  the  banks  ?  Say  that  there 
had  been  a  run  upon  all  the  banks,  and  that  the  whole  sum  of 
$83,535,597  of  specie  had  been  taken  by  returning  that  sum  in 
bank  notes,  it  would  have  left  in  circulation  $123,567,880  wilh- 
out  any  specie  to  redeem  them.  But  to  meet  this  circulation  ot 
$123,567,880  the  banks  would  have  held  a  demand  against  the 
public  for  loans  and  discounts  of  $691,945,580.  Do  you  not 
see  that  if  the  public  could  pay  the  banks  this  balance  of  $123,- 
567,880  in  bank  notes,  there  would  still  be  a  balance  in  favor 
of  the  banks  of  $563,376,700,  less  their  deposits  ;  and  that  if  re- 
quired to  pay  up  their  entire  deposits,  there  would  still  be  a  bal- 
ance in  favor  of  the  banks  of  $314,586,577  to  be  paid  in  specie, 
for  they  held — 

Loans  and  discounts, $091,945,580 

Specie, 83,5:}4,59T 

$TT5,4S0,177 

Their  circulation  was  but, '  -       $007,102,471 

Their  deposits, 233,803,120 

$400,904,000 

Leavins  balance  due  to  the  banks,  after  paying  bills  and  deposits,  $314,580,577 

But  we  have  seen,  on  the  authority  of  Mr.  Colwell,  that  in 
1857,  the  banks  of  New  York,  with  $12,000,000  in  specie  and 
but  8,000,000  in  circulation,  had  95,000,000  of  deposits,  show- 
ing that  a  very  large  part  ot  the  deposits  were  credits  given  by 
the  banks  to  their  customers,  and  that  instead  of  representing 
debts  due  by  the  banks  to  the  public,  the  deposits  represented 
to  a  great  extent  credits  given  by  the  banks  to  facilitate  the 
movement  of  commodities,  which  credits  were  adjusted  daily 


22 

by  exclianfjing  them  at  the  clearing  lioiise,  ami  therefore  were 
not,  as  many  suj)pose(l,  a  specie  demand  against  tiie  banks. 

Does  any  one  ask  why,  if  such  be  the  condition  of  the  banks, 
their  notes  depreciate,  and  why  tiiey  are  compelled  to  suspend 
specie  payment  i  I  reply  timt  the  l»anks  suspend,  not  because 
of  any  dej)reciation  of  their  notes,  but  because  they  ure  unable 
to  redeem  them  in  specie,  and  that  they  are  unable  to  pay  spe- 
cie to  the  public,  because  the  public  are  unable  to  pay  bank 
notes  to  them.  The  Bank  note  is  used  as  a  substitute  rather 
than  as  the  representative  of  specie,  and  the  banks  suspend  pay- 
ing specie,  because  the  demand  for  bank  notes,  resulting  from 
some  political  or  tinancial  derangement  of  the  monetary  system, 
is  such  that  they  cannot  bo  otherwise  supplied  in  requisite  quan- 
tities. The  purpose  of  the  suspension  therefore  is  to  enable  the 
banks  to  supjtly  the  jniblic  with  an  increased  quantity  of  bank 
notes,  which  they  could  not  do,  if  they  continued  to  pay  specie. 
Thus  the  Bank  of  England  suspended  jiayment  in  1797,  because 
she  could  not  otherwise  supply  the  bank  notes  requisite  to  carry 
on  the  war  with  France,  and  the  banks  of  the  United  States 
suspended  in  1812,  because  they  could  not  otherwise  supply  the 
bank  notes  i-equisite  t(j  maintain  the  war  with  England,  and 
having  partially  resumed,  they  again  'suspended,  because  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  chartered  for  the  avowed  purpose  of 
aiding  the  process  of  resumption,  became  the  agency  through 
which  the  merchants  of  England  absorbed  and  remitted  to  Eng- 
land the  specie  of  this  country  preparat}'  to  the  resumption,  in 
1825,  of  specie  payments  by  the  Bank  of  England.  They  again 
suspended  in  1S37,  because  Parliament,  having  emancipated 
the  West  India  slaves  and  abolished  the  monopoly  of  the  East 
India  Company,  placed  in  the  Bank  of  England  $100,000,000 
to  pay  the  West  India  claimants,  and  some  $25,000,000  of  the 
commercial  assetts  of  tiie  East  India  Company,  which  being 
loaned  by  the  Bank  to  the  money  dealers  of  England,  inflated 
the  currency  at  least  50  per  cent,  and  caused  the  wildest  specu- 
lations in  Mexican  and  South  Amejican  lo.^ns  and  mines  and 
other  visionary  projects.  When  required  to  pay  the  large  sums 
due  to  the  West  India  claimants,  the  demand  for  specie  was  in- 
creased by  an  extraordinary  demand  for  foreign  breadstuffs  and 
by  the  transfer  of  the  public  deposits  from  Mr.  Van  Buren's 
pet  banks  to  the  State  Treasuries  and  the  consequent  specie  cir- 
cular, intended  to   sustain   the  pet  banks,  which    liad   become 


23 

largely  indebted  by  speculations  in  the  pnblic  lands.  As  the 
banking  system  of  the  United  States  was  a  part,  and  the  weak- 
er part,  of  the  British  system,  their  banks  were  compelled  to 
suspend,  because  the  export  of  specie  to  London  under  the  pres- 
sure of  the  Bank  of  England,  was  such  that  they  could  not  other- 
wise supply  the  requisite  quantity  of  bank  notes  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  Again  in  1857,  the  demand  for  silver  to 
pay  the  expenses  of  the  war  in  India  was  such  that  the  Bank 
of  England,  by  a  turn  of  the  bank  screw,  caused  such  an  export 
of  specie  from  New  York,  that  the  banks  of  the  United  States 
were  compelled  to  suspend,  not  because  their  notes  were  depre- 
ciated, but  because  they  could  not  otherwise  supply  the  people 
of  the  United  States  with  the  requisite  quantity  of  bank  notes. 
And  again,  the  banks  in  the  Confederate  States  have  suspended, 
not  because  their  notes  have  depreciated,  but  because  they  could 
not  otherwise  aid  the  Confederate  States  with  the  funds  requi- 
site for  the  maintenance  of  the  present  war.  Is  it  not  proved 
that  the  idea  that  a  bank  note  should  be  at  all  times  converta- 
ble  into  specie  is  a  fallacy  ?  Is  it  not  proved  that  the  test  of 
the  value  of  a  bank  note  is  its  use  in  the  purchase  of  commodi- 
ties and  the  payment  of  debts?  Does  it  not  represent  credit 
rather  than  specie,  and  if  the  credit  represented  by  bank  notes 
may  be  made  available  as  a  currency,  equal  to  specie,  may  we 
not  give  to  the  Treasury  notes  equal  value  as  currency  ? 

I  admit  that  the  value  of  specie  may  appreciate ;  but  I  deny 
that  the  notes  of  well  conducted  banks  depreciate,  and  more 
especially  in  times  of  panic  ;  for  then,  to  use  the  words  of  an 
intelligent  director  of  the  Bank  of  England  before  a  committee 
of  Parliament,  "it  is  not  specie,  but  more  bank  notes,  that  is 
wanted."  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  bank  notes  are 
then  more  difficult  to  obtain,  and  will  purchase  more  of  other 
commodities  than  in  times  of  financial  prus!"»erity.  A  general 
suspensidn  of  the  banks  is  the  consequence  and  not  the  cause  of 
a  financial  crisis.  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  scarce  any 
property  will  sell  for  as  much  now,  payable  in  the  notes  of  the 
suspended  banks,  as  the  same  could  have  been  sold  for  before 
the  suspension,  payable  in  the  notes  of  the  same  banks. 

There  is  another  circumstance  which  gives  increased  value 
to  bank  notes.  The  demand  of  the  public  against  the  banks, 
(to  wit,  their  circulation  and  deposits)  is  payable  at  uncertain 
and  distant  periods,  whilst  the  demands  of  the  banks  against  the 


24 

public,  (to  wit,  for  loans  and  discounts,)  is  certain  and  at  short 
dates.  The  public,  therefore,  is  required,  in  payment  of  their 
dues  to  the  banks,  to  deliver  either  bank  notes  or  specie ;  and 
as  the  sum  of  bank  notes  in  circulation  is  so  much  less  than  the 
sums  due  the  banks,  the  continuous  and  repeated  demand  for 
bank  notes  to  pay  dues  to  the  banks,  maintains  their  value, 
without  reference  to  their  redemption  in  specie.  This  feature 
of  the  banking  system  is  important  in  considering  the  efl'ect 
which  a  large  issue  of  Treasury  notes,  to  be  used  as  currency, 
will  have  on  the  interests  of  the  banks.  It  is  known  that  the 
profits  of  banking  are  greatest  when  money  is  most  abundant, 
and  if  Treasury  notes  should  be  substituted  for  bank  notes  as 
currency,  the  etlect  must  be  that  the  debtors  to  the  banks  will 
pay  them  in  Treasury  notes,  instead  of  bank  bills.  In  such  case, 
the  banks  will  h  ive  the  Treasury  notes,  with  which  tu  redeem 
their  own  notes,  or  to  be  loaned  to  their  customers  as  money, 
and  their  profits  will  be  no  less  than  if  the  payments  had  been 
made  in  gold  and  silver ;  for  in  that  case,  the  only  use  they 
could  make  of  specie  would  be  to  redeem  their  circulation  or  to 
lend  it  to  their  customers,  and  if  the  banks  can  use  the  Treasury 
notes  as  specie,  the  value  will  be  the  same  as  specie.  We  ac- 
cordingly see  that  the  banks  unite  in  advising  an  issue  of  Treas- 
ury notes  for  $100,000,000,  in  addition  to  the  issue  already  au- 
thorized; the  smaller  denominations  to  be  without  interest. 

I  argue  that  as  the  notes  are  convertible  into  Bonds,  the 
question  to  be  considered  is  not  so  much  what  sum  may  be 
issued  without  interest,  as  what  sum  may  be  advantageously 
used  as  currency.  The  estimate  must  be  conjectural;  because 
we  have  seen  that  with  a  circulation  of  $8,000,000  onlv,  the 
daily  bank  settlement  at  the  Clearing  House  in  New  Tork  were 
8^0,000,000;  and  that  whilst  the  average  amount  of  money 
(bank  notes  and  specie)  used  in  the  operations  of  trade  in  Eng- 
land and  Wales  from  1840  to  1856  had  diminished  nearly  eight 
millions  of  dollars,  the  annual  average  increase  of  bills  of  ex- 
change amounted  to  $90,000,000,  and  that  there  was  at  one 
time  in  circulation  $900,000,000  of  such  hills  !!!  The  sura  of 
Treasury  notes,  which  maybe  substituted  for  bank  notes,  specie,  ' 
bills  of  exchange,  and  other  modes  of  credit,  can  only  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  test  of  experience.  But  we  may  refer  to  the  fact  ' 
that  the  circulation  of  the  banks  of  the  United  States,  as  given 
above,  was  $207,102,477,  and  that  this  suni  was  required  when 


— as  we  bavo  seen — the  ^vhole  niovement  of  the  cotton  crop, 
equal  to  8200,000,000,  was  made  hj  the  use  of  foreign  credit, 
to  show  that  the  sniu  required  as  currency  in  the  Confederate 
States  maj'  be  much  greater  than  the  issue  of  bank  notes,  when 
they  were  part  of  the  United  States.  How  far  Treasury  notes 
or  Confederate  bonds  may  be  substituted  for  tlie  foreign  credit 
used  in  the  movement  of  our  exports,  is  a  question  v/orthy  of 
the  "deepest  consideration. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Bank  of  Enghmd  should  re- 
mit their  post  notes,  payable  twelve  months  after  date,  for  the 
purpose  of  purchasing  the  entire  cotton  crop;  and  this  projjosi- 
tion  has  been  favorabl}^  received  in  influential  quarters.  The  ' 
whole  capital  of  the  Bank  is  but  $72,675,000,  of  which  870,000,- 
000  is  invested  in  3  per  cent,  consols.  As  the  Bank  is  forbid- 
^den  to  issue  its  notes  for  more  than  the  sum  of  the  bullion  in 
its  vaults  in  addition  to  the  capital  thus  invested,  the  sum  which 
it  is  authorized  to  issue  depends  on  the  bullion  it  may  have, 
and  is  tlierefore  uncertain  and  would  be  seldom,  if  ever,  equal 
to  the  value  of  the  crop.  Those  who  make  this  proposition 
must  be  ignorant  of  this  provision,  or  must  contemplate  an 
amendment  of  its  charter  lor  that  purpose.  But  one  single  f\ict 
is,  of  itself,  a  conclusive  answer  to  this  suggestion.  The  Bank* 
of  Enijland  derives  its  profits  from,  and  is  the  chief  agent  of,  ^  i 
British  commerce,  which  rests  upon  British  manufactures.  It 
is  not  to  be  ])resumed  that  the  planters  of  the  South  will  place 
tii«  control  of  their  cotton  with  an  Institution  so  much  identified 
with  the  British  manufactnrer;  for  it  will  be  manifestly  the  in- 
terest of  the  Bank  ta  reduce  the  price  in  the  British  market, 
which  will  necessarily  regulate  the  price  in  this. 

Again,  I  do  not  suppose  the  proposition  contemplates  that 
the  Bank  of  England  shall,  itself,  become  the  purchaser  of  the 
cotton,  but  that  the  post  notes  shall  be  loaned  to  individuals, 
who  may  become  the  purchasers.  The  objection  is  no  less  valid 
— for  as  none  could  purchase  without  a  credit  in  the  Bank  of 
England,  the  eflfect  would  be  to  place  the  control  of  the  cotton 
in  that  Bank,  which  is  interested  in  maintaining  the  commerce, 
credit,  and  prosperity  of  England,  and  controlled  by  persons 
who  have  formed  ascbciations  for. the  avowed  purpose  of  jDro- 
moting  the  growth  of  cotton  elsewhere,  in  preference  to  its  pro- 
duction by  us. 

Again  ;  If  this  were  not  bo,  we  have  seen  that  whilst  the 


26 

goveniineut  of  England  has  placed  more  than  ^4,000,000,000 
at  3  per  cent.,  and  the  Savings  Banks  hold  more  than  $170,- 
000,000  of  deposits  at  less  than  3  ])cr  cent.,  the  interest  charged 
by  the  Bank  of  England  fluctuates  from  2  to  10  per  cent.  I 
trust  it  will  require  no  argument  to  satisfy  the  planters  of  the 
South  that  it  will  be  most  nnwise  to  place  the  control  of  the 
price  of  their  cotton  M'ith  any  foreign  agency  whatever,  and 
especially  such  an  agency  as  the  Bank  of  England  is.  That 
Bank  is  the  financial  agent  of  the  government,  as  well  as  of  the 
merchants  and  manufacturers,  of  England,  and  having  its  capi- 
tal invested  in  consols,  it  may  be  said  that  its  resources  depend 
entirely  on  its  credit.  "With  a  capital  of  $72,675,000,  seventy 
millions  of  which  is  invested  in  a  debt  never  to  be  paid,  and  the 
real  value  of  which  is  the  annual  interest  (or  $2,100,000  per 
annum),  aided  by  the  regulation  which  gives  them  a  control 
over  the  credit  of  the  government,  and  brings  the  commerce 
and  manufactures  of  England  nnder  its  supervision,  the  Bank 
of  England  may  be  said  to  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  so  reg- 
ulating tlie  commerce  and  the  currency  of  England  as  to  make 
the  commerce  ot  the  rest  of  the  world  subservient  to  the  welfare 
and  the  progress  of  England.  The  wisdom  of  the  measures  and 
policy  of  the  Bank  have  been  the  subject  of  much  controversy 
in  Parliament  and  in  the  press ;  and  many  able  essays  have 
been  written  to  prove  that  the  theory  that  the  bills  of  the  Bank 
are  and  should  be  the  actual  honafide  representatives  of  specie, 
is  a  fallacy.  The  system  of  finance  and  of  credit  has  been  pro- 
gressive; and  the  concessions  to  the  Bank,  resulting  from  the 
fallacy  that  gold  and  silver  are  the  only  safe  and  legitimate  rep- 
resentatives of  bank  credit,  have  given  to  the  Bank  of  England 
the  power  which  it  exerts  over  the  cred/t  and  currency  of  Eng- 
land, and  of  all  other  countries  holding  extensive  commercial 
relations  with  England.  Tiie  process  by  which  the  Bank  exerts 
its  power  is  illustrated  by  two  Diagrams,  prepared  from  a  man- 
uscript memorandum  and  a  published  exhibit  taken  from  more 
than  four  thousand  returns  of  the  Bank  of  England,  given  to 
me  in  1857  by  Mr.  Edward  Hazleword,  a  London  banker,  which 
will  bo  found  on  the  opposite  page. 

Seventy  millions  of  dollars  of  the  capital  of  the  Bank  is  in- 
vested in  consols,  and  it  is  authorized  to  issue  this  sum  in  bank 
notes.  It  is  also  authorized  to  issue  bank  notes,  in  addition  to 
this  seventy  millions,  equal  to  the  sum  of  bullion  in  its  vaults  ; 


Diagram. 

Showing  the  Fluctuations  of  the  ^4y>wwU  o/ notes  issiudhij^of  the 
liahi/itics  o/tJicBrnd'  ofEngtand  for  if.n  yeca'slj^oifi  Wt^toMSA- 


\l)vtt(irs.     fS4A 

IS^J 

f8'!,e 

/S4.7 

i84^ 

l8U9 

^8So 

fSSf 

/8SH 

f8S3 

(7.!  ooo.oco 

, 

A 

/  N 

fSS.ooo.offc 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\     A 

yi.iJ.ooo.ooc 

''\yv 

i 

f 

^\ 

f^.. 

\ 

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f-'tS.OOO.OOP 

y\ 

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A 

A  y\/ 

.   / 

\ 

Sotesi.r  .ru'ol 

A 

/^  \ 

/ 

\ 

Aa> 

n/^ 

\  / 

V 

I..1J.000.V01 

V 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/  vv 

v 

\ 

/ 

V 

t2S.OfO.000 

A 

\              ; 

/\ 

\         / 

US,  OOP.COO 

/  \ 

\     1 

'  \ 

\ 

1 

y 

io.s,ooo,ooo 

. 

\ 

* 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

, 

/ 

\ 

9S.0OQ.  coo 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\       A 

V 

/ 

\       j 

\  / 

\ 

SS.OOO.COO 

/ 

\    P 

\ 

\      i 

s       / 

\      / 

\/ 

\ 

i 

y    \ 

\/ 

\ 

\   / 

vy 

\   / 

\ 

7d  coo.  ooo           / 

\   \ 

V 

\ 

\J 

\/ 

\ 

^rt»^  fta^iA«;M         / 

\  / 

V 

V 

. 

ShoTt^in(j  ^leFtnctuahcTi.f  rfi  tke?'rf^e  c/ivt(^'e~^f  c-tfar^ocd  hy  tkeJicitcJi  pfErfffland 
as  re^utaUd  tvf  ffic J?  noJZfzt  of  bullion  ui  l/s  votxIu  tlte-Hame^ivzllie  jtiarffzn  i^e 
jiresentmq  the  buZlien  i?i  tmlltnits  of  dotlaf^.f  (frpinS3S,ooo.OOOto&lOO  ooo.OOO) 
and  tJt£  vf^ega/ar  tines  jncaeatifu/  me  rates  o/zn/ei^e-ft 


27 

tbus,  bj  reference  to  the  first  dia.'.«:rain,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
perpendicular  lines  represent  the  years  from  ISi-i  to  1853,  in- 
clusive, and  that  the  notes  issued  in  1852  amounted  to  $178,- 
000,000— that  is,  $70,000,000  on  account  of  the  capital  invest- 
ed in  consols,  and  $108,000,000  on  account  of  the  bullion  in  its 
vaults;  by  turning  to  the  second  diagram,  it  will  be  seen  that 
figures  on  the  margin  represent  the  sum  of  bullion  in  the 
Bank  in  millions  of  dollars,  and  that  as  in  1852  the  bullion  was 
$108,000,000  the  issue  was  $178,000,000,  and  the  rate  of  inter- 
est was  but  two  per  cent.,  whereas  in  December,  1857,  the  bul- 
lion in  the  Bank  was  but  $35,000,000,  and  the  rate  of  interest 
was  ten  per  cent. 

Does  any  one  ask  how  this  fluctuation  in  the  rate  of  interest 
charged  by  the  Bank  of  England,  can  affect  us  or  our  banks  ? 
I  answer  that  our  banking  system  is  but  a  part,  and  the  weak- 
est part,  of  the  British  system,  and  rests  upon  the  same  fallacy, 
to  wit,  the  idea  that  gold  and  silver  is  the  only  safe  basis  of 
credit  and  currency.  This  I  have  proved  by  the  analyses  of  our 
banks  and  their  assets;  and  all  who  have  studied  the  effect  of 
the  contractions  and  expansions  of  credit  and  currency  by  the 
Bank  of  England,  know  that  the  eflect  of  a  low  rate  of  interest 
in  England  is  to  inflate  the  currency  and  increase  the  values  of 
pro2)erty,  and  that  the  effect  of  a  high  rate  of  interest  is  to  ren- 
der money  scarce  and  depress  the  values  of  property  ;  and  that 
this  contraction  and  expansion  by  the  Bank  of  England  acts  on 
us,  through  our  banks,  because  the  purpose  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land is  to  throw  upon  the  commerce  of  England  the  onus  of 
bringing  back  to  its  vaults  the  requisite  quantity  of  specie,  and 
that  therefore  our  merchants,  who  may  buy  British  goods  under 
the  expectation  that  a  fund  may  be  created,  by  the  sale  of  our 
cotton  in  Liverpool,  which  will  enable  them  to  buy  a  bill  upon 
London  to  pay  this  debt,  may  find  that  the  cotton  cannot  be 
sold  ;  or,  if  sold,  it  has  been  at  such  a  depreciation  that  they 
will  be  compelled  to  obtain  the  specie  from  our  banks  to  be  re- 
mitted to  London  in  payment  of  this  debt.  The  effect  of  taking 
the  specie  from  our  banks,  is  to  make  bank  notes  as  well  as  spe- 
cie scarce  and  dear  with  us,  and  we  are  thus  made  the  victims 
of  the  contractions  and  expansions  of  the  Bank  of  England, 
which  regulates,  at  pleasure,  the  condition  of  our  banks,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so  as  long  as  our  banking  system  rests  on 


t28 

tliesaine  fallacy  of  paying  specie,  and  remains  the  weiikest  ]^nrt 
i  the  Cnti.sli  system 

The  only  rcmccjy — the  only  piKtoctioii,  which  \m-  can  have 
<>r  hope  lor,  is  in  a  lar^'c  issue  of  Treasury  notes  by  the  Confed- 
erate government,  convertible  into  Confederate  Bonds  bearing 
such  a.ratc  of  interest  that,  whenever  the  issue  of  notes  may  ex- 
ceed the  sum  required  for  currency,  the  excess  will  be  convert- 
ed info  Bonds.  Thus  the  demand  will  regulate  the  quantity  of 
notes  used  as  cnrreticy  ;  such  a  currency  will  not  bo  convertible 
into  specie,  and  therefore  will  not  bo  used  to  take  the  specie  out 
tif  oi:r  banks  to  be  sent  to  the  Bank  of  England,  but  it  will  be 
epial  to  specie  for  our  domestic  use  ;  for  the  provision  that  the 
iiDtes  may  be  converted  into  Bonds  and  that  the  Bonds  may  be 
ejuverfced  into  notes,  will  so  regulate  the  quantity  of  our  cur- 
\\H\cy  as  to  i>revcntany  depreciation  of  the  values  of  our  pruj)- 
iiid  enable  the  j)lanters,  the  values  of  whoso  annual  ex 
j'lrtcJ  will  soon  be  more  than  three  hundred  millions  of  dollars, 
tu  create  an  agency  by  investing  a  part  of  the  proceeds,  which 
can  place  their  crops  in  the  foreign  markets,  and  protect  their 
value  against  the  depreciation  which  must  be  the  frequent  re- 
curring consequence  of  a  dependence  upon  the  banking  system 
of  England,  or  of  the  Confederate  States,  so  long  as  that  system 
pretends  to  rest  on  a  specie  basis,  and  is  subject  to  bo  ••■^.t'-i  •''•■' 
— as  it  must  and  wlil  be — by  the  Bank  of  England. 
Yuui'j  tiiily, 


